

Christopher Clary, "India-Pakistan Nuclear Rhetoric Timeline," unpublished working paper, updated November 7, 2003.

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Date	Quote	Speaker	Citation	Links
18-Mar-98	"To ensure the security, territorial integrity and unity of India we will take all necessary steps and exercise all available options. Towards that end we will re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons."	BJP and Alliance Partners	"National Agenda for Governance," at <a href="http://www.bjp.org/natagenda.htm">www.bjp.org/natagenda.htm</a> (accessed March 31, 1998).	
3-May-98	China is "potential threat No. 1."	Fernandes	John F. Burns, "India's New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat," <i>New York Times</i> (May 5, 1998).	
11-May-98	<b>India announces it conducted 3 nuclear tests.</b> "You would already be aware of the underground nuclear tests carried out in India. In this letter, I would like to explain the rationale for the tests. I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last ten years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our country, specially Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir... The series of tests are limited in number and pose no danger to any country which has no inimical intentions towards India."	Vajpayee	"Indian's Letter to Clinton On the Nuclear Testing," <i>New York Times</i> (May 13, 1998).	<a href="#">Link</a>
13-May-98	<b>India announces it has conducted an additional 2 nuclear tests.</b>			<a href="#">Link</a>
14-May-98	"... a nuclear weapons race is on in the region now." "... what India has done is short of a declaration of war." Called India's nuclear weapons "Pakistan specific."	For Min Gohar Ayub Khan	Steven Mufson, "Pakistan Weighs Response to India," <i>Washington Post</i> (May 15, 1998) and Stephen Kinzer, "Pakistan Is Under Growing Pressure Not to Respond to India With Atom Test," <i>New York Times</i> (May 15, 1998).	
	"India's actions, which pose an immediate and grave threat to Pakistan's security, will not go unanswered."	Munir Akram, Pak Amb to CD	Stephen Kinzer, "Pakistan Is Under Growing Pressure Not to Respond to India With Atom Test," <i>New York Times</i> (May 15, 1998).	
18-May-98	"Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world [and] roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir." India's decision to build nuclear weapons "has brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pakistan relations" and "signifies--even while adhering to the principle of no first strike--[that] India is resolved to deal firmly with Pakistan's hostile activities in Kashmir."	L.K. Advani	Kenneth J. Cooper, "Indian Official Warns Pakistan," <i>Washington Post</i> (May 19, 1998).	

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20-May-98	"Up to now, India's policy to such provocation has been essentially reactive. At the [gov't] meeting two days back it was decided that further misadventures on Indian territory shall be dealt with in a pro-active manner."	L.K. Advani	"Delhi again warns Islamabad," <i>Dawn</i> (May 21, 1998).	
27-May-98	"India, mindful of its international obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence and to ensure that in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion... The Government on this occasion reiterates its readiness to discuss a 'no-first-use' agreement with that country [Pakistan], as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum. India shall not engage in an arms race. India shall also not subscribe to reinvent the doctrines of the Cold War."	Gol	"Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy," Paper laid on the table of the House on May 27, 1998, available online at <a href="http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclearpolicy.htm">www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclearpolicy.htm</a> .	
28-May-98	<b>Pakistan announces it conducted 5 nuclear tests.</b> " [The tests] have demonstrated Pakistan's ability to deter aggression. Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to weaponization of India's nuclear programme. This has led to collapse of the existential deterrence and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region. Immediately after its nuclear tests, India had brazenly raised the demand that Islamabad should realize the change in the geostrategic situation in the region and threatened that India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan... After due deliberation and a careful review of all options, we took the decision to restore the strategic balance... These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional... We have instituted effective command and control structures."	Sharif	"Text of Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif's statement at press conference in Islamabad on 28th May by Pakistan TV," via <i>BBC Summary of World Broadcasts</i> (May 30, 1998).	
29-May-98	"We have nuclear weapons, we are a nuclear power," Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan said in an interview with The Associated Press. "Our retaliation would be taken swiftly, with vengeance and devastating effect." Reiterated that Pakistan would place nuclear warheads atop the Ghauri missile. Expressed concern of an Indian preemptive strike prior to testing.	For Min Gohar Ayub Khan	Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan to stand up to Indian 'aggression,' shrugs off sanctions," <i>The Associated Press</i> [PM Cycle] (May 29, 1998).	
30-May-98	<b>Pakistan announces one additional nuclear test.</b> "The devices tested correspond to weapons configuration, compatible with delivery systems... The fact of our existence as the neighbour of an expansionist and a hegemonistic power taught us the inevitable lesson that we must search for security. Contemporary history held only one lesson for us. The answer lay in credible deterrence. Today we have proved our credibility. There are no doubts left any more. The era of ambiguity is behind us." "Our capabilities demonstrated by our six nuclear tests are only for self-defence and only to deter	ForSec Shamshad Ahmad	"Asia: Extracts of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Statement," <i>AAP</i> [Australia Associated Press] <i>Newsfeed</i> (May 31, 1998).	

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	aggression."			
??-May/June-98	<p>"We have clarified that our tests are intended solely for assuring our own security. Their only purpose is to prevent nuclear threats to us, and coercion, and thus preserve peace and stability. We have declared that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against any state, and are willing to enter into treaty obligations in this regard... Our tests are not directed at any particular country. We are only reacting rationally to a nuclearised environment--as other countries have..."</p> <p>"We have clarified that our sole objective is to ensure our own security through a minimal and credible deterrent capability. We are not striving to achieve nuclear parity with any other country. India does not wish to enter into any kind of nuclear arms race with any country... Fears that border clashes might escalate to a nuclear level are groundless. This has never happened anywhere in the world. For example, border clashes between China and the former USSR did not escalate in this manner. Global experience is that nuclear weapons minimise the risk of major war. USSR and the US with vast differences in their political systems had successfully kept the nuclear peace for over five decades. There is no reason why we in South Asia cannot do as well."</p>	Indian MEA, Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division	Ministry of External Affairs, Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division, "Brief on India's Nuclear Tests," [May/June 1998??] available online at <a href="http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/briefonnuclartests.htm">http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/briefonnuclartests.htm</a> .	
31-May-98	"It won't need months or weeks; we can deploy nuclear weapons in a matter of days." "I will say our devices are more consistent, more compact, more advanced and more reliable than what the Indians have." "In efficiency, in reliability... and the very fact that we have used a very high technologically enriched uranium."	A.Q. Khan	Bill Gertz, "Scare preceded Pakistan nuke test," <i>Washington Times</i> (June 1, 1998).	
1-Jun-98	Pakistani official announces that Shaheen-I has been developed and is nuclear-capable. Also announces Shaheen-II will be ready by end of year for test-flights.	Samar Mobarik Mand	John Ward Andersen, "Pakistan Claims It Has New Missile; Scientist Touts Nuclear Capability of Shaheen-I as U.S. Expresses Doubt," <i>Washington Post</i> (June 2, 1998).	

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16-Jun-98	"... we have no intention of engaging in a nuclear arms race and building huge arsenals as we have seen other nuclear weapons states do, because their doctrines were predicated on nuclear war." "India's nuclear doctrine is qualitatively different from that of other nuclear weapons states. Therefore, we do not need to, or intend to, replicate the kind of command and control structures which they required. Our approach is to have a credible deterrent which should prevent the use of these weapons." "India's nuclear policy is not predicated on war but its avoidance."	Vajpayee	Kenneth J. Cooper, "Leader Says India Has A 'Credible' Deterrent," <i>Washington Post</i> (June 17, 1998).	
29-Jul-98	<b>Vajpayee-Sharif meet at SAARC summit in Colombo</b>			
2-Aug-98	In response to increased shelling along the LoC: "India must remember that there are now two nuclear states in the South Asian subcontinent. There new status demands of them [a more] responsible attitude."	Sharif	Surinder Oberoi, "'Two nuclear states' battle in Kashmir," <i>Washington Times</i> (August 3, 1998).	
1-Sep-98	"If the permanent five's possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would India's possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous? If the permanent five continue to employ nuclear weapons as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its own state power and national security?... If deterrence works in the West--as it obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons--by what reasoning will it not work in India?" "India, mindful of its international duties, is committed to not using these weapons to commit aggression or to mount threats against any country. These are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India, too, is not subjected to nuclear coercion. India has reiterated its desire to enter into a no-first-use agreement with any country, either negotiated bilaterally or in a collective form. India shall not engage in an arms race, nor, of course, shall it subscribe to or reinvent the sterile doctrines of the Cold War."	Jaswant Singh	Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," <i>Foreign Affairs</i> 77, no. 5 (September-October 1998), pp. 43, 49-50.	
7-Oct-98	<b>Karamat resignation; Musharraf appointed COAS.</b>			
15-Oct-98	<b>Beginning of Foreign Secretary talks in Islamabad. Both sides propose conventional and nuclear CBMs.</b>		Both sides describe the CBM proposals in some detail in the relevant non-papers. If you would like I can fax you our copies.	
11-Mar-99	"General V.P. Malik believes in the hypothesis that India could substantially harm Pakistan in a limited border war due to its preparedness, large forces, and huge quantities of modern weapons, whereas Pakistan will not be able to use its nuclear weapons against India because of this unforeseen situation."	V.P. Malik	[This is the only citation I could find. It is a FBIS translation of a Pakistani source citing a BBC interview.] Nazir Haq, "Limited war between Pakistan and India," <i>Khabrain</i> [Islamabad] (March 11, 1999), <i>FBIS-NES-1999-0314</i> .	
11-Apr-99	Agni II ballistic missile tested; followed by Pakistani tests of the Ghauri-II on April 14 and first Shaheen test on April 15.			

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13-Apr-99	Conventional and nuclear deterrence means that "there is no threat of a conventional war. The threat lies at the application of indirect strategy and that is the low intensity conflict by India and also an attempt towards economic strangulation."	Musharraf	General Pervez Musharraf, "Security Environment of Pakistan," Speech before the Karachi English Speaker's Union, April 13, 1999 (mimeo).	
15-May-99	"We must build up our conventional forces to deter the adversary's aggressive designs. Since World War II, no nation has ever exercised the nuclear option. Conventional weapons continue to be the actual tools of war even in the nuclear era."	Musharraf	B. Raman, "Musharraf's Views Before the Coup: A Collation," South Asia Analysis Group, Paper 92, accessed online at <a href="http://www.saag.org/papers/paper92.html">www.saag.org/papers/paper92.html</a> .	
30-May-99	"We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity." [Two days later, the MFA spokesman Tariq Altaf stated that Ahmad was not referring to nuclear weapons.]	Pak. For. Sec. Shamshad Ahmad	Celia Dugger, "Atmosphere Is Tense as India and Pakistan Agree to Talks," <i>New York Times</i> (June 1, 1999).	
4-Jul-99	"Well, what do they say, 'Que sera, sera,' " he said. "What will be, will be. We hope it will not come to the nuclear thing." [Unclear when Hussain made statement. Only reference I've found to this statement.]	Pak. Info. Min. Mushahid Hussain	Celia Dugger and Barry Bearak, "Kashmir Thwarts India-Pakistan Attempt at Trust," <i>New York Times</i> (July 4, 1999).	
	<b>Sharif-Clinton agreement on Kargil pullout</b>			
12-Jul-99	"By the grace of God, Pakistan is not a wall of sand or a child's plaything. We have the ability to deal befittingly with aggression. Had war been imposed on us, the invader would have lived to regret the day. However, we do not wish to make war, nor have we looked for it. We know that in a nuclear conflict there can be no victors." "It has been my constant effort that our countries be spared the horror of a nuclear war. Only a desire for collective suicide can prompt us to take such a step. However, going by the attitude of India, it did seem to us that New Delhi was rapidly moving towards war. The use of air and land power in Kargil by India was on a scale associated with a large and regular war only."	Nawaz Sharif	"Prime Ministers [sic] Address to the Nation" (July 12, 1999).	
17-Aug-99	<b>Release of Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine</b>			<a href="#">Link</a>
27-Aug-99	Q: "You will recall that in March, I had discussed the possibility of Pakistan planning some form of conventional conflagration using its newly obtained nuclear parity in order to force the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue. In that sense, was India too relaxed about the consequences of Pokhran-II?" A: "No, quite the contrary. After the nuclear status was acquired, it stood to reason, both military and strategic reason, that any possibility of a conventional conflict will decline." Q: "But is that really the case?..." A: "The real reasons for this particular misadventure will come out in due course. But I don't think it had anything to do with the nuclear scenario."	Indian Lt. Gen. Krishnan Pal, 15 Corps Cmdr	Praveen Swami, "'We did fairly well'," <i>Frontline</i> (August 27, 1999), pp. 35-36.	
7-Sep-99	"We have always believed that nuclear deterrence could be exercised by Pakistan and India at the lowest possible level. We were, therefore, initially encouraged by Indian	For Sec ??	Foreign Secretary's Statement on "India's Nuclear Doctrine: Implications for Regional and Global Peace and Security," presented at the Institute of Strategic	

	<p>statements that it wanted to maintain a position of 'minimum credible deterrence.' However, New Delhi left the interpretation of the concept deliberately vague. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh asserted that 'credible minimum deterrence' was a dynamic concept and not fixed in 'time and space.'" "The nuclear doctrine announced by India is obviously incompatible with both the idea of 'credible minimum deterrence,' as well as the concept of 'Strategic Restraint Regime.' "The size of India's nuclear arsenal, and its operational deployment, would transform it into a threatening 'first strike' force against Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Such massive, deployment can conceivably be designed purely for deterrence. India's profession of 'non-first use' of nuclear weapons is only a facade to justify a second strike capability and large scale acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons."</p>		<p>Studies (Islamabad: September 7, 1999).</p>	
	<p>"Certainly, deterrence is not India's desire. India plans for developing a vast conventional force coupled with a large nuclear arsenal are aimed at building an offensive, and not a defensive military capability." "The development of such a nuclear arsenal by India will oblige Pakistan to take appropriate action to preserve the credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture and the capability of self-defense... Let me state clearly and unequivocally that Pakistan can and will find ways and means to maintain credible nuclear deterrence against India without the need to match it--bomb for bomb, missile for missile." "The growing imbalance in conventional capabilities will accentuate Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence. This will have the consequence of lowering not raising the 'threshold' of possible use of nuclear weapons in South Asia."</p>			
<p>12-Oct-99</p>	<p><b>Musharraf ousts Sharif</b></p>			

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25-Nov-99	<p>"In 1971, India exploited power disparity for aggression and military intervention to the detriment of Pakistan's integrity.... Pakistan was compelled to undertake a painful reappraisal of the earlier policy of nuclear abstinence. The conclusion was unavoidable: Pakistan had to develop the capacity to deter another adventure against our country. In the absence of alternatives, acquisition of the nuclear option was conceived as a means of deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. Safeguarding the peace and security of our country was the sole objective. Pakistan entertains no ambition to great power status or regional domination. Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian buildup will necessitate review and reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of the deterrent Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capability. But we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race."</p>	Abdul Sattar	<p>"Pakistan Responds To India's Nuclear Doctrine," <i>Disarmament Diplomacy</i>, no. 41 (November 1999); also Raja Zulfikar, "Pakistan to upgrade N-deterrence: Sattar," <i>The News</i> (November 26, 1999).</p>	<a href="#">More</a>
29-Nov-99	<p>Key elements of nuke policy: (a) Minimum credible nuclear deterrent, (b) Test moratorium, (c) continued missile flight-tests following international norms, (d) No-first-use, (e) Survivable deployment posture, (f) Civilian command and control, (g) continued commitment to global nuclear disarmament. Retaliation only makes survivability critical to ensure credibility. Minimum is not "a fixed physical quantification; it is a dynamic concept..." Non-instantaneous retaliation. Different peace-time and war-time deployment postures.</p>	Jaswant Singh	<p>C. Raja Mohan, "India not to engage in a n-arms race: Jaswant," <i>The Hindu</i> (November 29, 1999).</p>	<a href="#">More</a>
24-Dec-99	<p><b>Indian Airlines 814 hijacking; hostage release on January 1.</b></p>			
19-Jan-00	<p>"Our nuclear potential, our basic strategy is the strategy of minimum deterrence. And our nuclear potential is meant as nuclear deterrence and a deterrence in the conventional as well as in the non-conventional field. Now as far as its physical usage is concerned, certainly I don't see its use at all. Any sane person would not like to see nuclear bomb being used [sic]. Having said that, I would certainly not like to use it." "It will be used as absolutely the last resort when the security and integrity of Pakistan is [sic] at stake. I would like to take a decision when the opportunity will come."</p>	Musharraf	<p>CNN interview quoted in "Use of N-weapons only as the last resort: Musharraf," <i>The News</i> (January 19, 2000).</p>	
24-Jan-00	<p>Fernandes delivers speech on "limited war" doctrine to IDSA. Fernandes said, Pakistan believes that "under the nuclear umbrella, it would be able to take Kashmir without India being able to punish it in return." India believed, on the other hand, that nuclear weapons "can</p>	Fernandes	<p>C. Raja Mohan, "Fernandes unveils 'limited war' doctrine," <i>The Hindu</i> (January 25, 2000).</p>	



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	deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war." Under the nuclear umbrella, "conventional war remained feasible though with definite limitations if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided." India "must possess conventional capability of a sufficiently high level in order to lift the nuclear threshold as much as possible."			
25-Jan-00	"We were able to keep Kargil war limited primarily due to nuclear as well as conventional deterrence... The whole scope and conduct of limited war would be governed by the 'end state' desired by the side that precipitated it. It will, thereafter, be follow the well-known 'ends-ways-means' loop. The escalation ladder would be carefully climbed in a carefully controlled ascent by both protagonists... Strategy adopted for Kargil, including Line of Control constraints, may not be applicable to the next war."	V.P. Malik	"Remarks by Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM, ADC," International Conference on Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century, IDSA, January 25, 2000 (mimeo).	
3-Feb-00	Pakistani NSC approves the establishment of the National Command Authority		"Better than India's, but with military tinge," <i>The Nation</i> (February 3, 2000). Also see, <a href="http://www.forisb.org/nca.jpg">www.forisb.org/nca.jpg</a> (this website only works occassionally).	
15-Feb-00	<b>Operation Vijay Chakra joint IAF, Army operation initiated.</b>			
24-Feb-00	"'Nuclearisation has cost India the edge it once held over Pakistan,' Mr. Shahbaz, Director-General (Disarmament), in the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, said... The Foreign Ministry official stated: 'The formal crossing of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan and India supported by the enunciation fo their respective nuclear postures is expected to enhance stability, provided the other essential elements of deterrence are fulfilled. These include early warning systems, C3I networks, second strike capabilities and credible delivery systems.'... 'The size of India's nuclear arsenal, and its operational deployment, woudl transform it into a threatening first strike force against Pakistan and other neighboring countries. Such massive deployment cannot conceivably be designed purely for deterrence. India's profession of no-first-use of nuclear weapons is a facade to justify a second strike capability and large scale acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons,' the paper added."	DG(Disarm) Shahbaz	Amit Baruah, "Pak. concerned over n-deterrence credibility," <i>The Hindu</i> (February 25, 2000).	
22-Mar-00	<b>Clinton trip to India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan</b>			
29-Jun-00	India moves (?) Prithvi missiles from Jallundur in East Punjab to Sikanderabad, or at least FAS announces it.			
21-Sep-00	Shaheen-I inducted into Pakistan Army: "'It was short-range Shaheen-I, which can be nuclear-tipped that prevented from attacking Pakistan during Kargil crisis,' said the [senior] official."		Shakil Shaikh, "Serial production of Shaheen-I underway," <i>The News</i> (September 21, 2000).	

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1-Oct-00	"Kargil has very distinctly highlighted the fact that in an escalatory matrix there is space for conventional conflict between low-intensity conflict and an all-out nuclear war."	COAS Padmanabhan	"New Army Chief to Focus on Nuclear Strategy," <i>Times of India Online</i> (October 1, 2000).	
9-Oct-00	"Through air power it makes it possible to strike targets at long-range with great accuracy with lethal weapons. This constitutes a key element in our national strategy of credible deterrence, both conventional as well as nuclear."	Fernandes	"India to maintain credible nuclear deterrent," <i>Expressindia.com Latest News</i> (accessed on October 10, 2000) at <a href="http://www.expressindia.com/news/daily/20001009/0902500.htm">http://www.expressindia.com/news/daily/20001009/0902500.htm</a> .	
17-Jan-01	If deterrence fails, India has to have a second strike capability that must be "so crushing that the other side would think 20 times before undertaking the initial strike. The fact that we have a thermonuclear weapon also is not unknown to the other side. They have nothing matching it."	COAS Padmanabhan	"Interview: Gen Sunderajan Padmanabhan, India's Chief of Army Staff," <i>Jane's Defense Weekly</i> (January 17, 2001), p. 32.	
17-Jan-01	Agni II ballistic missile tested; ready for induction		K. Subrahmanya, "Agni II ballistic missile tested successfully," <i>Deccan Herald</i> (January 18, 2001).	
25-Jan-01	Inam ul Haque's strategic restraint regime speech. Including: "Prior to India's 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan was prepared to live with 'existential deterrence'. In our now nuclearised region, Pakistan believes it would be best to preserve mutual deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan will not enter an arms race with India. However, if India continues to move up the nuclear ladder, Pakistan may be compelled to take the steps necessary to preserve the credibility of deterrence. We are prepared to discuss, in fairly specific terms, our requirements for a minimum credible nuclear deterrence, if India is prepared to do so. However, if the well publicised Indian nuclear doctrine is any indication of the future direction of India's nuclear programme and ambitions, it should be a matter of deep concern for the international community, as it is for us. ... Yet India has not disavowed the ambitious goals and plans for a 'triad' of land, air, and sea based delivery systems which could entail the acquisition of several hundred nuclear weapons."	For Sec Inam ul Haque at the CD	"Statement by H.E. Mr Inam ul Haque, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, in the Conference on Disarmament - 25 January 2001" (mimeo).	
26-Jan-01	Pakistani officials announce that Shaheen-I, II are in regular production and have been inducted into the Pakistan Army.		Shakil Shaikh, "Shaheen-I, II in regular production," <i>The News International</i> (January 26, 2001).	

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26-Mar-01	Dawn report on Musharraf speech: "We are always outnumbered... we maintain a minimum deterrence, which we will always maintain." Spelling out three stages of deterrence, Gen Musharraf emphasized that minimum deterrence, which could be quantified in comparison to the enemy's strength, should be followed by 'ability to threaten enemy's such vulnerable targets which go beyond their tolerance threshold'."	Musharraf	Shamim-ur-Rahman, "Minimum deterrence essential, says CE," <i>Dawn</i> (March 27, 2001).	
31-Mar-01	Prithvi successfully test-fired		"Prithvi successfully test-fired," <i>Deccan Herald</i> (March 31, 2001).	
18-Apr-01	India successfully tests the geosynchronous launch vehicle (GSLV)		Kalyan Ray, "GSLV launch successful," <i>Deccan Herald</i> (April 18, 2001).	
7-May-01	India conducts Exercise Poorna Vijay ("Complete Victory")-Two division level exercise, joint air and land components, nuclear dimension as well.		See Gaurav Sawant, "More exercises to help armed forces achieve Poorna Vijay," <i>Indian Express</i> (May 8, 2001) and "Indian war-games near border soon: Troops to get N-strike training," <i>Dawn</i> (May 1, 2001).	
8-May-01	India working on nuclear-armed aircraft interception: "Our aim is to intercept the enemy aircraft and shoot it down before it comes inside our territory."	Air Marshall S. Krishnaswamy, Western Air Command	"IAF fine-tuning nuclear interception techniques," <i>Indian Express</i> May 9, 2001).	
14-Jul-01	<b>Agra summit begins</b>			
11-Sep-01	<b>September 11th</b>			
16-Oct-01	<b>Powell in Islamabad; New Delhi on 17th</b>			
29-Oct-01	Seymour Hersh article on U.S. contingency planning for securing Pak nuclear arsenal is posted on the New Yorker website.		Seymour M. Hersh, "Watching the Warheads: The Risks of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," <i>The New Yorker</i> (November 5, 2001).	
9-Nov-01	<b>Bush-Vajpayee meet; Bush-Musharraf meet on next day</b>			
12-Dec-01	Prithvi successfully test-fired		"Prithvi test fired," <i>The Hindu</i> (December 13, 2001).	
13-Dec-01	<b>Indian Parliament attack</b>			
15-Dec-01	"During the Kargil war, we could have crossed the border and finished off the enemy but we did not, choosing to exercise restraint instead. Let them not test our patience and consider it a sign of weakness."	Vajpayee	Mohua Chatterjee, "Our patience is running thin, says Vajpayee," <i>Times of India Online</i> (December 15, 2001)	
7-Jan-02	"We will stick to it [no first use]. We will also not use nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear state and thirdly no surgical strike has been planned against anyone."	Fernandes	"No war, but troops to stay where they are: George," <i>Indian Express</i> (January 8, 2002).	
12-Jan-02	<b>Musharraf's address to the Nation</b>			<a href="#">More</a>
16-Jan-02	<b>Powell in South Asia (16th-Pak; 17th-18th-India)</b>			<a href="#">More</a>
25-Jan-02	Short-range Agni tested			

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	<p>"This (the test) is not directed against any country. This is part of technological evolution of our missile programme and its timing was determined solely by technical factors," Nirupama Rao, spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs, said.</p> <p>Signalling that the missile tested today could carry nuclear warheads, Ms. Rao said the launch was part of India's effort to indigenise and ``guarantee credible nuclear deterrence".</p>		<p>Atul Aneja and Sandeep Dikshit, "Short-range Agni test-fired," <i>The Hindu</i> (January 26, 2002).</p>	
	<p>"Today's test-firing of the short range Agni missile... is not aimed at increasing the current military pressure on Pakistan, highly-placed sources in the Government say... The testing of the missile system, originally scheduled for mid-December, was postponed after the attack on Parlimentaent House last month, the sources add... [T]he Government had informed the Pakistan High Commission here about it earlier this week." [Also informed the P-5, Japan, Germany and EU.]</p>		<p>C. Raja Mohan, "Missile test was delayed to avoid escalation," <i>The Hindu</i> (January 26, 2002)</p>	
	<p>"Pakistan's deterrence, which consists of its quantified force, capability of causing unacceptable damage to the enemy and our resolve, is in place."</p>	<p>Musharraf</p>	<p>Shakil Shaikh, "Pak deterrence in place, says Musharraf," <i>The News International</i> (January 26, 2002).</p>	
<p>4-Feb-02</p>	<p>"Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if (a) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold); (b) India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold); (c) India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling); (d) India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization)."</p>	<p>DG SPD Kidwai to Italian physicists</p>		<p><a href="#">Full Rpt.</a></p>
<p>13-Feb-02</p>	<p><b>Musharraf-Bush meet in DC</b></p>			
<p>13-Feb-02</p>	<p>Musharraf states there are indications that India conducted/was planning to conduct a nuclear test.</p>	<p>Musharraf</p>	<p>"National Press Club Luncheon with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf," <i>Federal News Service</i> (February 14, 2002)</p>	
<p>18-Feb-02</p>	<p>IAF "air war" exercise "Trishul"</p>		<p>Atul Aneja, "India set for military exercises," <i>The Hindu</i> (February 19, 2002).</p>	
<p>19-Feb-02</p>	<p>Reports of IAF, Indian Navy getting nuke weapons training at BARC in Pak press</p>		<p>"Navy, IAF train in handling nukes," <i>The Nation</i> (February 19, 2002).</p>	
<p>27-Feb-02</p>	<p><b>Attack on Sabarmati Express at Godhra sparks Gujarat riots</b></p>			<p><a href="#">More</a></p>

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8-Mar-02	"India has reduced the number of troops massed on the border with Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani intelligence source told AFP on Friday. 'There are credible reports that we have received that the Indian forces have thinned out from various positions from the borders along Pakistan,' he said... 'We have also received (intelligence reports) that the Indian airforce which was at a ready-to-strike position has also been stepped down,' he said."		"India reduces border troops: Pakistan intelligence source," <i>Agence France Presse</i> (March 8, 2002).	
14-Mar-02	"Pakistan has the conventional and nuclear capability to counter Indian land, sea or air incursion... Pakistan has taken minimum defensive measures required to hold the Indian army back after assessing the plans and strength of the enemy... We don't believe in passive defence. We cannot wait for the enemy's advance once the first bullet has been fired by them. We will like to create a situation by blocking the enemy's advance and inflicting so much loss that our offensive forces could be launched to weaken the enemy further... Probably, we might enter the Indian territory and fight on the Indian soil once the first bullet is fired by them... We will not fight a defensive war. We will not wait for their advance once the war is started by them."	Qureshi	"Armed forces ready to meet Indian threats: ISPR," <i>The News International</i> (March 15, 2002).	
22-Mar-02	<b>U.S. pulls out non-essential personnel and dependents following Mar. 17 church attack</b>			
23-Mar-02	"By Allah's Grace Pakistan today possesses a powerful military might and can give a crushing reply to all types of aggression. Anybody who poses a challenge to our security and integrity would be taught an unforgettable lesson."	Musharraf	"President Pervez Musharraf's address to the nation," (March 23, 2002) available online at <a href="http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/Pres_23Marc.htm">http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/Pres_23Marc.htm</a> .	
25-Mar-02	On 25 Mar, Fernandes calls threat "childish" and says Musharraf lives in a "make believe world." Additionally, "We should not be forced to go in for an Afghanistan-style military operation to check the menace of terrorism sponsored from across the border." "Pakistan should not misconstrue our restraint in a wrong way, They have tasted defeat at our hands several times. India is a powerful nation and Pakistan stands nowhere near it. Musharraf should know Pakistan's 'aukat' (standing) and speak accordingly."		"Musharraf threat childish: Fernandes," <i>Press Trust of India</i> (March 25, 2002)	
7-Apr-02	In an interview in Der Spiegel, Musharraf said that it would use nuclear weapons against its neighbor India, but only if it were "in danger of vanishing off the map." "The use of nuclear weapons is only the last resort for us. We are acting responsibly. And I am optimistic and self-confident enough to believe that we can also defend ourselves conventionally."	Musharraf	"Pakistani leader says use of nuclear weapons against India would be 'last resort,'" <i>AP Worldstream</i> (April 7, 2002).	

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11-Apr-02	Pakistan "upgrades" strategic command; appoints Lt. Gen. Ghulam Mustafa to head it.		Gaurav C. Sawant, "India mulls options as Pak upgrades its nuclear command," <i>Indian Express</i> (April 11, 2002).	
25-Apr-02	Indian cabinet approves handover of nuclear arsenal to the Strategic Nuclear Command		Vishal Thapar, "India's nuclear command to be in place by June," <i>Hindustan Times</i> (April 25, 2002).	
30-Apr-02	<b>Musharraf referendum</b>			
14-May-02	<b>Kaluchuk Massacre</b>			
17-May-02	"I fail to understand how could Pakistan even consider a nuclear option. Given the size of India and Pakistan, which country will be around... Pakistan will be stupid to consider nuclear option."	Omar Abdullah (MoS EA)	"Pakistan will be stupid to consider nukes: Omar," <i>Press Trust of India</i> (May 17, 2002)	
18-May-02	<b>Pakistan asked by India to withdraw its High Commissioner</b>			
20-May-02	"To cope with the possible attack or any advance by Indian Army, Pakistan has installed Shaheen missiles which have the range of 750 kilometres on appropriate points. Pakistan has also informed influential world powers including US that if India resorts to any adventure then Pakistan has every right to use all options at its disposal. Pakistan also assured all world leaders that primarily, it believes in dialogue and despite all that if India continues provocative moves Pakistan will use all options for the security of its sacred land. In this case, it will be an unlimited war."		"Shaheen missiles installed," <i>The Nation</i> (May 20, 2002).	
	India places BSF and CRPF under Army command; Coast Guard under Navy command		Atul Aneja, "Army takes command of first tier of defence," <i>The Hindu</i> (May 20, 2002).	
21-May-02	Reports that Pakistan is ready to test the Shaheen III		"Shaheen III with additional range ready," <i>The Nation</i> (May 21, 2002).	
22-May-02	"The time has come for a decisive battle and we will have a sure victory in this battle," the Prime Minister said, adding that his visit to Jammu and Kashmir had a deep meaning and "whether Pakistan or the world take note of it or not, a new chapter of victory and triumph will be written in the history books soon." The Prime Minister said the country believed in peace, but it should not be construed as "our weakness". "The enemy has thrown us a challenge by waging a proxy war. We accept it and pledge to give it a crushing defeat," he said.		Luv Puri, "Be ready for decisive battle, PM tells jawans," <i>The Hindu</i> (May 23, 2002).	
	"Any misadventure by India will be met with full force. India must not harbour any illusions of waging and winning a war against Pakistan. This would be a major miscalculation leading to grave consequences."	Pak For Ministry Spokesman	B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Pak. decries Vajpayee's speech," <i>The Hindu</i> (May 23, 2002).	
24-May-02	Indian cabinet approves handover of nuclear arsenal to the Strategic Nuclear Command			

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25-May-02	Pakistan begins series of missile tests with Ghauri (1,500-km range) on May 25, Ghaznavi (290-km range) on May 26, and Abdali (180-km range) on May 28.			
28-May-02	<b>Jack Straw in Islamabad; travels to New Delhi later in same day</b>			
	"India is not talking about it [nuclear conflict] now. General Musharraf and some of the ministers in his government and others have spoken very casually about nuclear war. India has not ever spoken about nuclear weapons."	Jaswant Singh	"India says Musharraf speech disappointing," <i>Times of India</i> website (May 28, 2002) at <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?t_id=11265454">http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?t_id=11265454</a> (accessed May 29, 2002).	
29-May-02	"Any incursion by the Indian forces across the LoC even by an inch will unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy."	Musharraf	"Musharraf vows to 'unleash a storm' if India attacks," <i>The News International</i> (May 30, 2002).	<a href="#">More</a>
	"Replying to a question on what might constitute an act of aggression by India, he said that any action by India across the border, any aerial attack on Pakistani territory and its assets, and any action to economically strangle Pakistan would be viewed as such and be responded to by Pakistan. As far as nuclear weapons were concerned, the fact was that both countries possessed such weapons, he said. While that should instill restraint on both sides, it did not seem to do so on the Indian side.... India should not have a license to kill with conventional weapons while Pakistan's hands were tied regarding other means to defend itself. Pakistan had to rely on the means it possessed to deter Indian aggression, he continued. It would not 'neutralize' that deterrence by any doctrine of no-first use... If India reserved the right to use conventional weapons, how could Pakistan--a weaker power--be expected to rule out all means of deterrence?"	Munir Akram, Pak Amb to UN	"Press Conference by New Permanent Representative of Pakistan," available online at <a href="http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/pakistanpc.doc.htm">http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/pakistanpc.doc.htm</a> .	
31-May-02	<b>U.S., following Great Britain doing so on May 22, withdraws all non-essential personnel and dependents and issues travel warning advising citizens to leave India because of war risk.</b>			
4-Jun-02	"Nuclear war at the present age is unthinkable. No sane personality would even discuss that... I believe that India and Pakistan ought to be sensible enough and responsible enough to prevent or avoid nuclear conflict."	Musharraf	"Musharraf offers unconditional talks," <i>The News International</i> (June 4, 2002).	
6-Jun-02	<b>Armitage arrives in Islamabad; leaves for Delhi on June 7. Musharraf reportedly pledges to "permanently" end infiltration and that message is conveyed to Delhi.</b>			
10-Jun-02	Interview with Defense Secretary Narain: " <i>Has the government factored in the possibility of the war turning nuclear?</i> " "Certainly. But Pakistan is not a democratic country and we don't know their nuclear threshold. We will retaliate and must be prepared for mutual destruction on both sides." ... " <i>What if there is another attack on</i>	Def. Sec. Yogendra Narain	"'A Surgical Strike Is the Answer': The Defense Secretary on India's Strategies and Preparedness," <i>Outlook</i> (June 10, 2002).	

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	civilians or military establishments? Will their be surgical strikes or a full scale war?" "Surgical strikes are the realistic option. But we also know that there will be retaliation on other parts of the border from Pakistan. It'll escalate and will not be confined to one region."			
	<b>Ban on use of Indian airspace by Pakistani aircraft is lifted; reports on June 11 that Indian warships move away from forward patrolling near Pakistani shoreline.</b>			
11-Jun-02	<b>Rumsfeld arrives in Delhi; leaves for Islamabad on June 12</b>			
18-Jun-02	"Heightened international concerns of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and the hesitation, frustration and inability of India to attack Pakistan or conduct a so-called limited war, bear ample testimony to the fact that strategic balance exists in South Asia and that Pakistan's conventional and nuclear capability together deter aggression." "By testing, with outstanding success, the delivery systems of our strategic capability, these men [Pakistani scientists] validated the reliability, accuracy and the deterrence value of Pakistan's premier surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems of the Hatf series, namely -- Ghauri, Ghaznavi and Abdali." "We need to ensure that the three basic ingredients of the deterrence - capability, credibility and resolve - never get compromised."	Musharraf	"Nation proud of missile test results, says Musharraf," <i>The News International</i> (June 18, 2002) and K.J.M. Varma, "Nuclear capability deterred India," <i>rediff.com</i> (June 18, 2002) at <a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jun/18war2.htm">http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jun/18war2.htm</a> .	
23-Jun-02	Q: "I thought India had a conventional edge." A: "If that were the case, India would have attacked us." Q: "Do you believe that Pakistan's nuclear option prevented war recently?" A: "No, I think it was [our] conventional deterrence."	Musharraf interview	Lally Weymouth, "Musharraf: Here's What I'll Do," <i>The Washington Post</i> (June 23, 2002).	
16-Jul-02	Sabit Qadam-II war game begins in Pakistan, reportedly designed to evaluate and upgrade Pak Army's capabilities to perform "under the current nuclear environment."		"War-game Sabit Qadam-II begins today," <i>The News Int'l</i> (July 16, 2002) and Rana Qaisar, "10-day war games conclude," <i>Daily Times</i> (July 30, 2002).	
20-Jul-02	<b>Straw in South Asia (20 Pak, 21 India)</b>			
27-Jul-02	<b>Powell in South Asia (27, 28 - India; 28 Pak)</b>			
2-Aug-02	Indian Army troops, with IAF fighter support, "evicted" Pakistani troops from point 3260 in Machil sector of Kupwara. Dubbed "Kargil-II" by some.	Fernandes to Parliament	"Pak had crossed border in August, George admits to Parliament," <i>Indian Express</i> (November 21, 2002). Also, "IAF used in J&K," <i>The Hindu</i> (November 22, 2002).	
7-Sep-02	<b>Musharraf heads to U.S. for a week, UN moot on 12th</b>			
12-Sep-02	"With nuclear weapons now in possession of both countries, it is small wonder that people describe South Asia as 'the most dangerous place on Earth.' Today, peace in South Asia is hostage to one accident, one act of terrorism, one strategic miscalculation by India."	Musharraf to UN	"Address by H.E. General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan at the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly," (September 12, 2002) at <a href="http://www.un.int/pakistan/s57gaPresident.htm">http://www.un.int/pakistan/s57gaPresident.htm</a> .	



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13-Sep-02	"In our South Asian region, nuclear blackmail has emerged over the last few months as a new arrow in the quiver of State-sponsored terrorism. Dark threats were held out that actions by India to stamp out cross-border terrorism could provoke a nuclear war. To succumb to such blatant nuclear terrorism would mean forgetting the bitter lessons of the September 11 tragedy. As far as India is concerned, we have repeatedly clarified that no one in our country wants a war -- conventional or otherwise. Nor are we seeking any territory. But absolutely everyone in India wants an end to the cross-border terrorism which has claimed thousands of innocent lives and denied entire generations their right to a peaceful existence with normal economic and social activity. We are determined to end it with all the means at our command. Let there be no doubt about it in any quarter."	Vajpayee to UN	"Address by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India at the 57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," (September 13, 2002) at <a href="http://www.indianembassy.org/pm/pm_sept_13_2002.htm">http://www.indianembassy.org/pm/pm_sept_13_2002.htm</a> .	
15-Sep-02	"I would say [this potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan] it's not as perilous as being quoted, because of the conventional balance that exists between the two countries. The danger of a conflict, yes. Previously the danger was there, in that the Indians were showing an intention through their rhetoric, and also they developed the capability when they moved their troops on to the borders. But now the intentions seem to have receded, because the rhetoric has gone down. But the capability of the forces, the armed forces still are in eyeball-to-eyeball contact. So to that extent, the capability exists, and therefore the danger. But when we talk of nuclear conflagration, I would differ. Now, if we know that there's a conventional armed balance between the two countries, and I'm reasonably sure that because of this balance, the conflict will never go to the limit of unconventional modes."	Musharraf	CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (September 15, 2002) transcribed by eMediaMillWorks.	
10-Oct-02	<b>Pakistani Parliamentary Elections</b>			
16-Oct-02	<b>India orders troop withdrawal</b>		"Govt. orders withdrawal of troops from IB," <i>The Hindu</i> (October 17, 2002).	
18-Oct-02	Pak-North Korea proliferation connection reported		David E. Sanger and James Dao, "A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence; U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," <i>New York Times</i> (October 18, 2002).	
30-Sep-02	"Unlike our neighbors we have not gone on the roof-tops to announce the setting up of a strategic command. But it defies logic that a country of this size does not have it."	CIDS, Lt. Gen. Pankaj Joshi	"Separate nuclear command on the anvil," <i>The Hindu</i> (October 1, 2002).	

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	"Pre-emption or prevention is inherent in deterrence. Where there is deterrence there is pre-emption. The same thing is there in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." "Every nation has that right. It is not the prerogative of any one country. Pre-emption is the right of any nation to prevent injury to itself."	Jaswant Singh	Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Every country has the right to pre-emption: Jaswant," <i>The Hindu</i> (October 1, 2002).	
2-Dec-02	"...Conceptually, India being a declared nuclear state with a no first use doctrine, it must have a nuclear triad with the strongest arm being at sea — underwater"	Navy chief Adm. M. Singh	"Nuke vessel on wishlist," <i>The Telegraph</i> [Calcutta] (December 3, 2002).	
30-Dec-02	"In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of Control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan." "I believe my message was effectively conveyed to Mr Vajpayee," he added. "There were threats on the border after September 11 and particularly after the Indian troops were sent to the borders, but now all threats are over," he said. "We have defeated our enemy without going into war," he added. "The enemy has withdrawn its forces and we are also withdrawing ours," Musharraf said.	Musharraf	"India was warned of unconventional war," <i>The News</i> (December 31, 2002).	
2-Jan-03	The Defence Minister, George Fernandes, today said that the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf's, reported statement about "using nuclear arms" against India was "rubbish" and would not escalate tension on the border... He said he did not take the statement seriously as Gen. Musharraf had not only ruled out the nuclear options but had also said that only "mad people" could think of such a possibility.	Fernandes	K. Balchand, "Musharraf remarks has no significance," <i>The Hindu</i> (January 3, 2003).	
4-Jan-03	Indian Cabinet Committee on Security approves creation of National Command Authority and appointment of CINC-Strategic Forces Command; restates Indian nuclear doctrine, including: (i) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; (ii) A posture of "No First Use" nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. (iv) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. (v) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; (vi) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.	CCS	Press Information Bureau, Government of India, "Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine," <a href="http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html">http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html</a> .	<a href="#">Full Rpt.</a>

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7-Jan-03	"We will suffer a little but there will be no Pakistan when we respond," Fernandes told a gathering of businesspeople in the southern city of Hyderabad. "We can take a bomb or two or more... but when we respond there will be no Pakistan."	Fernandes	"Indian defence minister warns Pakistan against nuclear rhetoric," <i>Agence France Presse</i> (January 7, 2003).	
9-Jan-03	First reports that Indian National Security Advisory Board suggested a review of NFU in its December 20, 2002 <i>National Security Review</i> .		"Abandon no-first use policy, Security Board tells govt," <i>rediff.com</i> (January 9, 2003), available online at <a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09ia.htm">http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09ia.htm</a> .	
10-Jan-03	800-km Agni test-fired. "This is not Warsaw pact Vs NATO situation where warheads and missiles were ready for fire with a button in a hand. There is no button in our case. Missiles and warheads are not permitted together. They are separated. There is a geographical separation between them. One has to go up to the escalation ladder then to come to the stage of pressing of the button," said the President when asked who controlled the nuclear button in Pakistan.	Musharraf	"Pak not violating nuclear proliferation regime," <i>Pakistan Observer</i> (January 10, 2003).	
13-Jan-03	"We have a nuclear doctrine. A nuclear and strategic force command chain in position. So we stand by the no-first-use policy."	Fernandes	"India not to review no-first-use policy," <i>The Hindu</i> (January 14, 2003).	
27-Jan-03	"We have been saying all through that the person who heads Pakistan today, who is also the whole and sole in-charge of that country, has been talking about using dangerous weapons, including the nukes. Well, I would reply by saying that if Pakistan has decided that it wants to get itself destroyed and erased from the world map, then it may take this step of madness, but if wants to survive then it would not do so," Mr. Fernandes said participating in a BBC World's phone-in programme in Hindi, ' <i>Aap ki baat, BBC ke saath</i> '.	Fernandes	"Pak. will be erased if it nukes India: Fernandes," <i>The Hindu</i> (Jan 28, 2003).	
8-Feb-03	<b>Pakistan asked by India to withdraw its High Commissioner</b>			
12-Feb-03	Brahmos test-fired			
7-Mar-03	Prithvi test-fired; Abdali test-fired hours later.			